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An important issue for multi-product firms to consider is economies of scope, i.e., whether there is any benefit
from producing two or more products, or whether specializing in producing only one product would be less costly.
We examined the economies of scope for Norwegian electricity companies because policy makers have decided to
force companies that both generates and distributes electricity to split their operations into two companies, one
engaged in generation only and the other in distribution only. We set out to test the validity of the policy makers
decision on unbundling generation and distribution. Using data from Norwegian electricity companies for the
period 2004–2014, we found evidence of economies of scope, meaning that policy makers’ insistence on sepa-
rating generation and distribution companies will have increased costs. We also found evidence of economies of
scale, meaning that there are cost savings in expanding outputs. Our findings provide important information to
consider in future policy decisions in the Norwegian electricity industry, probably with implications for other
countries.1. Introduction increase competition in the electricity industry, avoid cross-subsidizationThe electricity industry in Norway, and in many other countries,
consist of market-oriented competitive entities in generation and power
trading, and, on the other side, natural monopolies within transmission
and distribution. Traditionally, most electric utilities worldwide have
performed all services from generation to distribution in the electricity
supply chain. However, electricity industries worldwide have undergone
profound changes involving strict separation of these services (Fetz and
Filippini, 2010).
In Norway, accounting unbundling was introduced in the electricity
industry in the 1990s. The European Union’s Second Energy Package was
adopted in Norway in 2007. It imposes rules on legal unbundling for
firms with more than 100,000 customers. In 2016, the Norwegian
parliament amended the Energy Act, with the changes taking effect from
2021. The amended legislation will introduce legal and functional
unbundling for all firms involved in electricity distribution. ‘Functional
unbundling’ means that the distribution company shall have its own
board, separate from the boards of other companies in the group.
The main motivation for the unbundling of services has been to. Mydland), kkar@binghamton
en in Section 3.
6 September 2019; Accepted 6
vier B.V. This is an open access arbetween generation and distribution, and to ensure that the distribution
system operators (DSOs) focus on network operations only, and in that
way may better exploit potential economies of scale within the electricity
distribution sector.
Unbundling might reduce the potential for cost savings from econo-
mies of scope (product diversification).1 However, the policy assumption
is that society will benefit from economies of scale through merging
distribution companies and increased competition in the power market.
These gains might be greater than the loss from not utilizing economies
of scope. We believe that this view is held by Norwegian policy makers
because the unbundling was implemented without referring to any
economies of scope studies for Norway or any other country.
Baumol et al. (1982) pointed out that economies of scope can exist
because of synergies in the joint utilization of labor and capital. The type
of labor required in the distribution and generation of electricity might
be quite similar. Furthermore, combining all elements of electricity
supply into one value chain from electricity generation to distribution
may lower production costs. Examples of positive synergies are adver-
tising and billing costs, and what Waldman and Jensen (2001) called.edu (S.C. Kumbhakar), gudbrand.lien@inn.no (G. Lien), roam@nve.no
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reserve capacity during emergency repairs and maintenance. Further-
more, as multioutput firms are bigger, one major benefit would be sav-
ings in procurement costs.
In this study, we ask: “What are the costs or benefits from separating
electricity distribution firms that also have generation of electricity into
two specialized firms?” and “What potential exist regarding economies of
scale among electricity generation and distribution firms?” The first
question relates to benefit (cost) of product diversification or economies of
scope. The second question relates to decrease (increase) in average cost
from expansion of output, meaning scale economies (diseconomies). To
do this, we estimate a cost model using data from 212 Norwegian elec-
tricity firms observed over a period of 11 years. In particular, we estimate
a quadratic cost function using the flexible technology approach of Triebs
et al. (2016). The flexible technology approach is useful because it allows
the technologies of integrated and separated firms to be different and
gives a plausible estimate of the effect of unbundling (product separation).
For the scope and scale measures, we do not follow the standard practice
of presenting the results at the mean or median values of output. In our
analysis, we seek to identify the costs and benefits of separating an inte-
grated firm into two specialized firms to see how the new legislation will
affect production cost of the Norwegian electricity industry. We present
scope and scale estimates for all combinations of output values for all 42
integrated firms in our dataset, instead for reporting their mean values (or
values evaluated at the mean values of data).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
a brief survey of the literature. Section 3 describes the model specifica-
tion and method. Section 4 describes the data and Section 5 presents the
results. In Section 6, we present our concluding remarks.
2. Literature review
It is somewhat surprising that, considering its policy importance,
there is little research on economies of scope in the electricity industry in
Norway. We are aware of only one recent report from the Norwegian
Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) that briefly addresses the
topic. Nevertheless, in 2015, NVE reported that the operational costs of
vertically integrated companies were 15% lower than those of other
companies.
One reason for the lack of studies in this area may be that it is difficult
to obtain data suitable for analyzing economies of scope.
Although many scope studies have been conducted within energy
markets in other countries, including the markets for electricity, gas,
water, and coal,2 only a few have focused on economies of scope and
scale in the electricity industry.3
Based on our knowledge, there have been five scope studies of US
electricity markets. Using cross-sectional data examining US electric
utilities, Kaserman and Mayo (1991), Kwoka (2002), and Arocena et al.
(2012) used data from 1981, 1989, and 2001, respectively. Meyer2 Among scope studies of the energy markets, we mention a few. Mayo (1984)
and Chappell and Wilder (1986) found evidence of economies of scope in the US
electricity and gas markets. Fraquelli et al. (2004) and Piacenza and Vannoni
(2004) examined the Italian electricity, gas, and water distribution markets,
while Farsi et al. (2008) examined the corresponding Swiss markets. Garcia
et al. (2007) studied North American water utilities, and Carvalho and Marques
(2014, 2015, 2016) studied Portuguese water utilities.
3 Carvalho and Marques (2016) used a Bayesian approach to estimate size and
scope economics in the Portuguese water sector. In our case, we use a simple
model, and find no good reason to use the Bayesian approach. Zellner (1971)
showed that, under uninformative priors, the classical regression and the
Bayesian results are identical. Furthermore, Carvalho and Marques (2016)
accounted for different types of service provisions by including dummies
(intercept) for each service type, which, as opposite of the Triebs et al. (2016)
flexible technology approach used in our study, does not allow technologies to
be completely different for different services.
40(2012a) and Triebs et al. (2016) both examined the US electricity market
with panel data covering the periods 2001–2008 and 2000–2003,
respectively. These studies provide empirical evidence for the existence
of significant economies of vertical integration between generation and
transmission/distribution in electricity supply companies. The estimates
of scope economies ranged from 4% to 27%. Both Arocena et al. (2012)
and Triebs et al. (2016) reported evidence of economies of scale, with
returns to scale (RTS) estimates ranging from 1.01 to 1.134
We found four studies of economies of scope of the European elec-
tricity industry, all of them used panel data. Jara-Díaz et al. (2004)
analyzed Spanish electricity generation and distribution companies for
the period 1985–1996. Piacenza and Vannoni (2009) examined the
Italian electricity market for the years 1994–2000, while Fetz and Fili-
ppini (2010) investigated Swiss generation and distribution companies
for the period 1997–2005. Gugler et al. (2017) studied 28 electricity
generation and transmission firms from 16 European countries for the
period 2000–2010. These European studies reported evidence of econ-
omies of scope, ranging from 6.5% to 60%, which are higher than the
estimates for the US. Both Jara-Díaz et al. (2004) and Fetz and Filippini
(2010) found evidence of economies of scale, with estimates of RTS at
1.07 and 1.4–1.7, respectively. As this brief review shows, no scientific
published economies of scope studies of the electricity market exist for
Norway or Scandinavia.
While there exist several nonparametric approaches, in this study, we
focus on parametric estimation to measure economies of scope. Examples
of theoretical contributions within the nonparametric approach include
Cherchye et al. (2008), Ferrier et al. (1993) and Grosskopf et al. (1992).
Examples of empirical work include Marques and Witte (2011), Morita
(2003) and Prior and Sola (2000).
3. Model specification and method
In this section, we describe the specifications of our model and the
estimation method used in this study. Before introducing the model, we
provide definitions of scope and scale economies. For economies of
scope, we measure the difference between the cost of one firm producing
two outputs and the costs (sum) of two specialized firms producing the
same outputs (see Baumol et al., 1982; Panzar and Willig, 1981).5
Economies of scope are measured as:
Scope ¼ ðCDðDÞ þ CGðGÞÞ  CIðD;GÞ
CIðD;GÞ ; (1)
where CDðDÞ is the cost for the specialized firms in distribution and is
usually obtained by setting the output of generation (G) to zero in CðD;GÞ;
i:e:; CDðDÞ ¼ CðD;0Þ: Likewise for the specialized firms in generation, the
cost is CGðGÞ ¼ Cð0;GÞ, and for the integrated firms with positive outputs
in both distribution and generation, the estimated costs are CIðD;GÞ ¼ CðD;
GÞ. If the scope measure is positive (or negative), economies (or dis-
economies) of scope exist.,6,7 Thus the presence of scope economies4 A summary of the most important previous empirical economies of scope
and scale studies within the electricity sector is presented in Table A1 in the
appendix. Meyer (2012b) provided a review of the theoretical and empirical
literature within the field of vertical economies and the costs of separating
electricity supply.
5 In some previous studies the term “economies of vertical and horizontal
integration” was used instead of “economies of scope and scale.” We believe
these terms are synonymous.
6 Note that in our analysis we focus on the economies of scope concept based
on the cost function. However, as pointed out by one referee, economies of
scope can also be studied by focusing on the production technology alone, see
e.g., Chavas and Kim (2007).
7 In our study we measure economies of scope by comparing integrated firms
and “fully specialized” firms. Chavas and Kim (2007, 2010) demonstrated how
to measure different levels of specialization.
9 The Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random effects (against
a standard OLS regression) rejects the null hypothesis. The p value of the test is
0.000.
10 We have low temporal variation in some variables in our data. Thus, we are
more interested in between variation than within variation. In addition, we use
an unbalanced panel where a portion of the sample has four or fewer observa-
tions per firm (i.e., panel data with a short time-series component). In cases such
as this, based on Clark and Linzer (2015), a fixed effect model exacerbates
measurement error bias and the random effect model is preferable. The fixed
effect model is therefore not be appropriate in our case.
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to produce both jointly instead of producing them separately.
Following Baumol et al. (1982), global economies of scale in a mul-
tioutput setting are defined as:
Scale ¼ CðD;GÞ
D ∂CðD;GÞ∂D þ G ∂CðD;GÞ∂G
(2)
If the scale measures are greater than, equal to, or less than unity, RTS
are increasing, constant, or decreasing, respectively. That is, cost is
increased by less than 1% for a simultaneous increase in G and D by 1% if
RTS>1. In this case, there is scale economies meaning that average cost is
decreased when outputs are expanded (i.e., expansion is cost-effective).
In estimating a single cost function that includes multiple firm types
jointly, a common technology among firm types is assumed. The question
is whether the technology used by the specialized utilities is identical to
that used by the utilities providing more than one service. If the tech-
nologies are different, and one assumes a common technology, the results
are likely to be wrong. For instance, results suggesting the presence of
economies of scope may actually be a result of scale economies. One way
to get around this issue is to perform separate estimations for each firm
type. This allows the technology to be different between the firm types.
Triebs et al. (2016) introduced a method that allows us to test for dif-
ferences in technology.
In our analysis, we use panel data, but, to simplify the notation, we
drop the subscripts i and t, where i denotes the firm, i¼ 1, …,n and t
denotes time, t¼ 1, …,t. We use a quadratic cost function and add flex-
ibility to it by allowing the technology to vary across specialized and
integrated firms. We do so by following the approach in Triebs et al.
(2016) whereby we use dummies for specialized and integrated firms and
write the cost function as:
C¼ Idum

α0 þ β1Lþ β2Qþ
1
2
β11L
2 þ 1
2
β22Q
2 þ β3E þ β4N þ
1
2
β33E
2
þ 1
2
β44N
2 þ 1
2
β12LQþ
1
2
β13LE þ
1
2
β14LN þ
1
2
β23QE þ
1
2
β24QN
þ 1
2
β34EN

þ Ddum

αD þ δ1Lþ δ2Qþ 12δ11L
2 þ 1
2
δ22Q2 þ 12δ12LQ

þ Gdum

αG þ γ1E þ γ2N þ
1
2
γ11E
2 þ 1
2
γ22N
2 þ 1
2
γ12EN

:
(3)
where C is total operational cost, and Ddum and Gdum are dummy var-
iables representing the distribution and generation companies, respec-
tively. Idum represents the integrated companies that have both
generation of electricity and distribution of electricity. The cost function
for each firm-type is obtained from eq. (3) by turning the appropriate
dummy on. For example, Ddum¼ 1 (Gdum¼ 0, Idum¼ 0) gives the cost
function for the distribution companies. Similarly, we can get the cost
functions for the generation and integrated companies. Kilometers of
high-voltage network (L) and number of customers (Q) represent outputs
of distribution companies. Megawatt hours of produced electricity (E)
and number of generators (N) are the outputs of the electricity generation
companies. We do not use input prices in our cost model because there is
no input price variation cross-sectionally in our data and the temporal
variation can be captured in the time dummies or the time trend variable
in the model. In Norway, union agreements regarding wages and social
benefits are centralized at the national level. Thus, the assumption of
constant input prices across firms is reasonable in a small country such as
Norway.8 As a result, homogeneity in input prices violation, as discussed8 For fixed input (factor) prices, the cost function is written as a function of
outputs. See F€are et al. (1990) and Varian (1992: p. 67). Temporal variations in
input prices are captured by the time dummies or time trend included in the cost
function.
41in Farsi et al. (2008) and Triebs et al. (2016), is not a problem in our
model.
By introducing the dummy variables Idum, Ddum, and Gdum for the
integrated firms and the two specialized comanies in distribution and
generation, respectively, the model in eq. (3) combines three separate
cost functions, one for each firm type, into one function. Use of the
dummy variables makes it possible to estimate the three separate cost
functions from eq. (3) simultaneously.
Our model is made stochastic by introducing the error term ui. To
control for firm heterogeneity, we include random effects. Thus, in our
estimation, we replace the constant terms α0; αD; and αG in eq. (3) with
ετ ¼ ðατ þ wiÞ, where the subscript τ ¼ 0, D, or G. The term wi is a time-
invariant, firm-specific random term that controls for firm
heterogeneity.,9,10
In scope studies, one or several outputs are zero for specialized firms.
There might be a problem with zero values when using a quadratic
function. If the number of zero values represents a large proportion of the
total number of sample observations, the parameter estimates may be
biased (Battese, 1997). This potential problem does not arise in Triebs
et al. (2016) approach because the zero values are eliminated when
estimating the model. E.g., if one estimates the technologies separately,
then no output data on electricity generation (E¼N¼ 0, meaning that
the firm is a distribution utility) will be used to estimate the technology
for the distribution utilities. These zero values will then be eliminated
when multiplied by Ddum, and the model reduces to one, for which only
the output data on the distribution utilities are used; the same applies for
the generation utilities. Furthermore, this approach is suitable for any
kind of functional form specified, including a translog cost function
specification.11 For further details, see Triebs et al. (2016).
In eq. (1) we presented the general definition of scope. From our
model specification in eq. (3) we obtain: ðCDdumðDÞþCGdumðGÞ ÞCIdumðD;GÞCIdumðD;GÞ . See
Fuss and Waverman (1981) for more on this.
The dummy variable specifications of the quadratic cost function
make it possible to test whether a common technology assumption is
appropriate. We can do this by performing a joint likelihood ratio test
with the following restrictions on our model:
β1 ¼ δ1; β2 ¼ γ2; β3 ¼ γ1; β4 ¼ γ2; β11 ¼ δ11;
β22 ¼ δ22; β33 ¼ γ11; β44 ¼ γ22
(4)
Note that the technology, e.g., for the generation companies, is ob-
tained by imposing the above restriction together with Gdum¼ 1, which
also implies Ddum¼ 0 and Idum¼ 0. Failure to reject the null hypothesis
with the above restrictions indicates the presence of a shared technology
for all firm types.11 Zero values are a problem also in the translog function specification because
the logarithm of zero is not defined (missing values will be created). Previous
studies have shown that the common approach by replacing zero values by some
arbitrary small number can influence the results (e.g., see Pulley and Humphrey,
1993). However, the flexible technology approach introduced by Triebs et al.
(2016) avoids the zero-value problem by allowing the technologies of the
specialized firms to be different from the integrated firms.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Total operating costs (1000 NOK):
Distribution firms 30,773 37,364 4126 16,117 274,822
Generation firms 19,065 20,054 255 12,272 146,887
Integrated firms
(distribution and
generation)
30,754 21,213 2485 22,952 91,701
Outputs of distribution firms:
Km of network 479 520 0 (37) 269 2909
Number of customers 13,943 22,315 0 (178) 6646 134,854
Outputs of generation firms:
Electricity MWh 276,804 296,476 0 (2391) 134,428 1,081,649
Number of
generators
8.07 9.73 2 5 68
Outputs of integrated firms:
Km of network 486 337 31 368 1185
Number of customers 7939 6236 391 6335 25,748
Electricity MWh 91,430 108,907 3861 14,640 535,554
Number of
generators
4.35 2.73 2 3 15
Time 2004 2014
Firm type observations:
Integrated firms
(distribution and
generation)
316 observations, 42 firms
Specialized firms
(distribution)
671 observations, 77 firms
Specialized firms
(generation)
507 observations, 93 firms
Total firms 1494 observations, 212 firms
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the minimum positive outputs for distribution
and generation.
Table 2
Marginal costs.
Integrated firms Specialized firms,
distribution
Specialized firms,
generation
Km of network (L) 30.00** (10.06) 27.71** (5.11)
Number of
customers (Q)
1.24* (0.57) 1.17** (0.15)
Electricity MWh
(E)
0.06* (0.03) 0.04** (0.01)
Number of
generators (N)
400.90 (897.95) 999.57** (139.17)
Observations 316 671 507
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. ** and * indicate significance at 0.01 and
0.05 levels respectively.
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The data comprise economic and technical information on Norwegian
electricity companies from 2004 to 2014 and were collected by the
NVE.12 In total, there are 1494 firm-year observations constituting an
unbalanced panel of 212 Norwegian electricity companies. Table 1 pre-
sents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis.
Total operational cost for each firm consists of the sum of material
costs, salaries, and other personnel costs (including pension costs), other
operating expenses, losses on receivables, losses on disposal of fixed as-
sets, internally priced services, and allocated overhead costs. All costs are
adjusted for inflation by an industry commodity price index, where
wages are the main component.13 The output variables for electricity
distribution are kilometers of high-voltage network (km of network) and
number of customers. We also considered including the number of
network stations as a proxy for electricity delivered. However, this would
have caused multicollinearity between the output variables. The ratio of
the number of customers and the number of network stations, and that
between the number of customers and the km of network, capture the
same effect. In urban areas, the number of customers is high compared
with the number of network stations and km of network, while in rural
areas, the situation is the exact opposite.
The output variables for electricity generation are electricity pro-
duction in megawatt hours (electricity MWh) and number of generators.
In a scope study, the minimum value of the output variables will natu-
rally equal zero because by definition, specialized firms do not produce
some outputs. The minimum values for distribution and generation
outputs in parentheses are the minimum output values, given that the
outputs are not zero.12 The data used in this study are confidential. Readers who wish to gain access
to the data must apply to the NVE for permission; see www.nve.no for details.
13 The price index was retrieved from Statistics Norway, Table 03363.
http://www.ssb.no/en.
42To control for time effects, we also include a time trend variable in
our estimation. Note that, because the cost function does not include
input prices, which only change over time, the time trend variable cap-
tures input price effects as well as other effects (technical change) that
shift the cost function. In other words, technical change cannot be
separated from any temporal changes in input prices.
Our data consist of three types of firms: integrated firms with positive
outputs for both distribution and generation, and specialized firms that
have positive output only for distribution or generation. There are large
variations in firm size in our data. For example, the lowest total opera-
tional cost is 255,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK), while the highest total
operational cost is about 275 million NOK. Large variation also exists in
the outputs.
5. Results
Using the estimated parameters from the model, we report the mar-
ginal costs at the mean values of our data for each of the four outputs
(Table 2). These are the derivatives of the estimated cost function with
respect to each output and are observation-specific.14 They tell us how
the costs are affected by changes in each of the outputs. Note that, even
though the cost elasticities for each firm type are presented in different
columns, the three cost functions are estimated simultaneously. All of the
marginal costs have positive signs as expected, and all but Number of
generators for the integrated firms are significant at the 5% level. The
results show that for the integrated firms, increasing Km of network by
1 km will increase cost by 30.00 (1000 NOK), ceteris paribus.
To test the restrictions presented in eq. (4), we performed a joint
likelihood ratio test. The test results are presented in Table 3. At the 1%
significance level, we reject the null hypothesis of shared technology.
Thus, these results support our model specification with the flexible
dummy variable approach. Furthermore, several studies have presented
evidence that the quadratic representation of the technology is superior
to the translog parameterizations (see e.g., F€are et al., 2010, 2016;
Chambers et al., 2013).15
The policy question to answer from this analysis is: “What are the
costs or benefits from separating one integrated firm into two specialized
firms?” Alternatively, we could ask what would happen to costs if two
specialized firms became one integrated firm. However, this is not rele-
vant for the Norwegian situation. Policy makers have decided to change
the Norwegian Energy Act so that all integrated firms within the industry
will be strictly separated into specialized firms by 2021.
In previous economies of scope studies, it is normal to use either
median or mean values of the data to calculate the scope measures.14 For the interested reader, the parameter estimates are available in the ap-
pendix (see Table A2).
15 We have also performed the study using a translog cost function specifica-
tion, but in this study the results are not totally convincing. However, for the
interested reader the modelling and results are available on request.
Table 3
Test for common technology: likelihood ratio test.
H0: χ2 DF P
β1 ¼ δ1
22.83 8 0.005
β2 ¼ δ2
β3 ¼ γ1
β4 ¼ γ2
β11 ¼ δ11
β22 ¼ δ22
β33 ¼ γ11
β44 ¼ γ22
Table 4
Economies of scope results for integrated firms.
Percentiles Economies of scope
1% 0.10
5% 0.08
10% 0.05
25% 0.02
50% (median) 0.10
75% 0.21
90% 0.38
95% 0.53
99% 0.92
Mean 0.18
Standard deviation 0.37
Fig. 1. Economies of scope and firm size using total operational costs as proxy
for firm size.
Notes: The solid black line is computed by locally weighted scatter-
plot smoothing.
Table 5
Economies of scope and firm output.
Distribution (km of network)
200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Generation
(MWh)
5000 51%
(2)
18%
(1)
10%
(1)
* * *
10000 51% 17% 18% * * *
Ø. Mydland et al. Economic Modelling 88 (2020) 39–46Alternatively, a two-by-two table that gives different scope estimates for
different combinations of output levels can be constructed. However,
these approaches are not always recommended because they are likely to
use combinations of output values that do not exist in the actual data set,
and which might not be realistic in the real world.16 To overcome this
problem we calculated economies of scope by using the parameter esti-
mates combined with all actual output combinations for the integrated
firms in our data set. We retrieved 316 economies of scope estimates from
an 11-year period for the 42 integrated firms. The distribution of these
316 estimated economies of scope measures for each model is presented
in percentiles in Table 4. The 1% percentile estimate represents the
smallest 1% economies of scope estimates from the distribution. We see
that the 1% percentile gives diseconomies of scope (0.10), meaning
that, for these integrated firms, costs will be reduced by 10% if they are
separated into two specialized firms. We find positive economies of scope
at the 25% percentile and above. At the median, the economies of scope
estimates are 10%.17
Table 4 shows the distribution of scope estimates using all the real
output combinations for the integrated firms, providing an overview of
economies of scope in the Norwegian electricity industry and showing
that there exist economies of scope for several companies in the industry.
In addition, it is interesting to determine what characterizes the firms
with diseconomies and economies of scope. In Fig. 1, a plot of the
economies of scope estimates by firm size shows that there is a clear
relationship between firm size and economies of scope. Fig. 1 uses the
scope measures in Table 4, but we have plotted the mean scope measures
for each firm against total operational costs (we used total operational
cost for each observation as a proxy for firm size for each time period in16 For the integrated firms in our data set, median L¼ 383.5 and median
E¼ 53,016. However, a company (with this output combination) does not exist
in our data set.
17 We also estimated our model without random effects, and the scope esti-
mates in the models at median values change from: 0.10 (random effect) to 0.18
(pooled OLS). The economies of scope results increase if we do not control for
firm heterogeneity.
43our data, 42 firms and 316 observations over 11 years). The solid black
line is a fitted line between economies of scope and total operational
costs to show the trend in the results. The results show an unambiguous
relationship between firm size and economies of scope. The largest
economies of scope estimates are for the smallest firms, meaning that the
costs of separating an integrated firm into two specialized firms are
highest for the smallest firms. The bigger the firms, the lower the econ-
omies of scope; there are even diseconomies of scope for some of the
biggest firms, meaning that the operational costs would be lower if
production is separated across two specialized firms.
To further investigate the firms’ characteristics, we examine the(6) (13) (4)
20000 36%
(13)
14%
(22)
10%
(9)
* 1%
(1)
*
50000 28%
(30)
10%
(35)
8%
(3)
* 2%
(8)
*
100000 29%
(2)
3%
(20)
5%
(12)
0.8%
(12)
8%
(10)
3%
(10)
300000 * 0.7%
(19)
9%
(6)
4%
(11)
11%
(7)
7%
(27)
Notes: * means no observations.
Table 6
Economies of scale results for integrated and specialized firms.
Percentiles Integrated
firms
Specialized firms,
distribution
Specialized firms,
generation
1% 0.82 1.03 1.02
5% 0.92 1.04 1.10
10% 0.94 1.06 1.22
25% 0.99 1.09 1.33
Median 1.07 1.15 1.50
75% 1.21 1.26 1.81
90% 1.79 1.44 2.34
95% 2.67 1.58 2.83
99% 2.99 1.92 4.35
Mean 1.95 1.21 1.80
St. dev. 2.82 0.19 4.38
Ø. Mydland et al. Economic Modelling 88 (2020) 39–46economies of scope results for different output levels in our sample of
Norwegian integrated firms. In Table 5, we present the mean values of
the scope estimates for the firms within each output combination. To
measure the output value for the distribution of electricity, we use km of
network, and for generation of electricity, we use electricity in MWh. We
can see the same trend in the results as that in Fig. 1, where we used total
costs as a proxy for firm size. We find the highest economies of scope
values for the lowest output combination values, suggesting that the
smallest firms in terms of output, have the highest economies of scope.
In Table 6, we present the economies of scale results for the integrated
and specialized firms in distribution and generation. The economies of
scale estimates follow the definition in eq. (2). Except for the smallest
percentiles, Table 6 shows increasing RTS across all three firm types. In
other words, our results imply that the distribution firms have not
exploited scale economies entirely. These findings are consistent with
previous scale studies using data from Norwegian electricity distribution
firms (see e.g., Mydland et al., 2018; Kumbhakar et al., 2015). An
interesting research topic would be to examine how costs in the industry
change if separating the integrated firms leads to more mergers among
the distribution companies.18 By doing a merger analysis, one could see
whether the cost savings from optimal merges can balance the loss of not
utilizing economies of scope. This topic is left for future research.
6. Concluding remarks
We found evidence of scope (benefit form product diversification)
and scale economies (benefit from expansion of outputs) in the Norwe-
gian electricity industry. Using a flexible technology approach, we ob-
tained estimates of scope and scale economies. This approach allowed us
to test whether specialized and integrated firms share the same tech-
nology. We found that the technology differs between firm types.
Further, we found a negative relationship between firm size in terms of
total costs, and economies of scope in our model. Our results also show18 The regulated distribution companies can represent “safe income” for an
integrated firm because 40% of the revenue cap is decided by the costs in the
distribution company. By unbundling distribution and generation into two
totally separated firms, one can avoid any cross subsidizations or anticompeti-
tive behavior. This might lead to an increased interest in merging more distri-
bution companies.
44that firms characterized by low output values in both the distribution and
generation of electricity have the highest economies of scope. These
findings suggests that, for the smallest companies in the industry, a policy
decision of strict separation between generation and distribution will be
costly.
From a political perspective, it might be desirable to separate gen-
eration and distribution companies. Because of natural monopolies in the
electricity distribution market, the distribution companies are regulated,
whereas the market for electricity generation is competitive (no natural
monopoly and thereby no regulation). If unbundling distribution and
generation leads to increased competition, less cross-subsidization, and
more productive DSOs, this might be beneficial for the electricity in-
dustry as a whole. However, as this study shows, the policy decision to
enforce strict separation also comes with a cost. Moreover, this cost
seems to differ across firms. The overall conclusion of this paper is that,
for the larger firms, there are no incentives to keep the firms integrated,
but for the smaller firms, distribution and generation should not be
unbundled.
Our result corresponds to previous economies of scope studies from
Europe and the US within the electricity distribution and generation
industry.19
In policy making, all pros and cons should be considered before a
political action is taken. One of the cons of introducing strict separation
between distribution and generation of electricity is the cost of not uti-
lizing economies of scope. In this paper, we provide new insights into this
issue, and our results are useful for the formulation of future political
strategy within the energy sector.
For future research, it would be interesting to combine the analysis on
both economies of scope and merger gains from utilizing economies of
scale to determine howwe can expect the cost structure in the Norwegian
electricity market to evolve. If the policy of separating integrated firms
into specialized firms leads to more mergers, the net cost changes might
be positive in the long run, provided that the companies utilize unex-
ploited economies of scale. To further investigate the robustness of our
results, it would be interesting to measure economies of scope and scale
using a nonparametric approach.
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Table A1
Summary of previous empirical scope and scale studies of combined generation and transmission/distribution electricity companies.
Author(s) Data Functional form Established method Economies of scope and scale*45Kaserman and
Mayo (1991)Cross-section (1981,
US)Quadratic cost function OLS Economies of scope (EOS)¼ 0.12 (at mean)Kwoka (2002) Cross-section (1989,
US)Quadratic cost function OLS EOS¼ 0.27 (at median). Reports substantial costs of vertical
integration and highest for the smallest utilitiesJara-Díaz et al.
(2004)Panel data (1985–1996,
Spain)Quadratic cost function
together with cost share
equationsSeemingly unrelated
regressions (SUR)EOS¼ 0.065–0.28. Returns to scale (RTS)¼ 1.07.Piacenza and
Vannoni
(2009)Panel data (1994–2000,
Italy)Multiproduct & multistage
Box–Cox transformed cost
functionNonlinear SUR EOS¼ 0.24. RTS¼ 0.96. Reports findings of both vertical integration
gains and horizontal economies of scopeFetz and
Filippini
(2010)Panel data (1997–2005,
Switzerland)Quadratic cost function Random effects GLS and
random coefficient
modelEOS¼ 0.50–0.60 (at median). RTS¼ 1.40–1.70 (at median). Presence
of considerable economies of vertical integration and economies of
scale for most companiesArocena et al.
(2012)Cross-section 2001, US) Quadratic cost function
together with cost share
equationsSUR EOS¼ 0.04–0.10. RTS¼ 1.01–1.03. Reports positive sample mean
estimates of both vertical and horizontal economiesMeyer (2012a) Panel data (2001–2008,
US)Quadratic cost function OLS EOS¼ 0.19–0.26, when separating generation from distribution and
retail. Reports that if generation and transmission remain integrated
but are separated from distribution and retail, EOS¼ 0.08–0.10.Triebs et al.
(2016)Panel data (2000–2003,
US)Flexible technology translog
cost functions with different
specificationsSUR EOS¼ 0.04 (0.40 when zeros are replaced by small numbers in the
common cost function model). RTS¼ 1.10–1.13. Reports evidence of
economies of scale and vertical economies of scope.Gugler et al.
(2017)Panel data (2000–2010,
16 European countries)Multistage quadratic cost
functionNonlinear SUR EOS¼ 0.14–0.20. Reports that at the median integrated utilities have
EOS¼ 0.14 while large scale utilities have EOS¼ 0.20.*Estimates of economies of scale (measured by RTS) are for integrated firms.Table A2
Parametric estimates.
Integrated firms Specialized firms, distribution Specialized firms, generationL 29.28 (24.72) 22.29 (8.77)
L*L 0.04 (0.07) 0.01 (0.01)
Q 1.16 (1.07) 1.52 (0.20)
Q*Q 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00)
E 0.11 (0.05) 0.04 (0.01)
E*E 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00)
N 367.60 (1727.86) 782.46 (222.34)
N*N 266.76 (245.35) 26.63 (6.44)
L*Q 0.001 (0.01) 0.001 (0.00)
L*E 0.001 (0.00)
L*N 19.03 (9.45)
Q*E 0.000 (0.00)
Q*N 0.55 (0.45)
E*N 0.03 (0.02) 0.004 (0.00)t 495.12 (676.33) 1049.50 (470.86) 549.24 (557.39)
65.04 (109.90) 225.46 (81.90) 34.34 (94.84)t*L 0.72 (2.08) 2.24 (0.86)
t*Q 0.12 (0.11) 0.13 (0.02)
t*E 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.00)
t*N 35.07 (203.19) 25.05 (32.90)
Const. 4088.680 (3714.10) 3575.15 (1974.99) 4317.90 (2095.94)
Observations 316 671 507
Log- likelihood 15654.70.89Notes: Standard error in parentheses.
R2 is calculated as squared correlation between estimated and observed costs, which is equivalent to R2 from OLS.In Table A2, we present the parameter estimates. Note that even though the parameter estimates for each firm type are presented in different
columns, the cost function for integrated, distribution, and generation firms is estimated jointly. The constant term refers to Idum, Ddum, andGdum from
eq (3). The estimation results are in levels.References
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